PQC Migration Roadmap: How to Build One and Where to Start
Jul 02, 2026
ArticleBuild a PQC migration roadmap: inventory and CBOM, risk ranking with Mosca, hybrid ML-KEM first, PKI next, and the 2027-2035 deadlines.
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What PQC readiness means, the metrics that measure it, a 7-step readiness assessment, maturity levels and a checklist for your post-quantum migration.
PQC readiness (post-quantum readiness) is an organization's ability to keep its data and systems secure once quantum computers can break today's public-key cryptography. A PQC-ready organization knows where RSA, elliptic-curve and Diffie-Hellman cryptography is used, has a funded plan to replace it with post-quantum algorithms such as ML-KEM and ML-DSA, and has the technical ability to change algorithms before regulatory deadlines.
Readiness is not a yes-or-no state. It is measured, tracked and improved over several years. This guide explains what PQC readiness covers, which metrics measure it, how to run a readiness assessment, and how to use the free DuoKey Quantum Risk Score as a starting baseline.
PQC readiness has four dimensions. A weakness in any one of them slows the whole migration.
| Dimension | Question it answers | Evidence of readiness |
|---|---|---|
| Visibility | Do we know where public-key cryptography is used? | A current cryptographic inventory, with CBOMs per application |
| Exposure | How much of it is quantum-vulnerable, and what does it protect? | Share of quantum-vulnerable components, mapped to data shelf life and business owners |
| Agility | Can we change algorithms without rewriting systems? | Algorithms set by policy, hybrid support in libraries, KMS, HSMs and network devices |
| Programme | Is there a funded plan with dates? | A PQC migration roadmap with owners, budget and executive approval |
Vendor readiness belongs to all four: much of your cryptography runs inside products you buy, so supplier roadmaps for ML-KEM and ML-DSA are part of your own readiness.
Three pressures make readiness a 2026 question rather than a 2030 one:
Pick a small set of metrics you can measure every quarter. These are the ones that move decisions:
| Metric | What it tells you | Where the data comes from |
|---|---|---|
| Inventory coverage | Share of applications, hosts and endpoints with a current CBOM or scan | Crypto discovery tools, CMDB |
| Quantum-vulnerable share | Share of cryptographic components using RSA, ECC or DH | CBOMs (nistQuantumSecurityLevel = 0) |
| Hybrid key-exchange adoption | Share of external TLS and VPN endpoints negotiating hybrid ML-KEM (e.g. X25519MLKEM768) | TLS scans, load balancer and VPN configuration |
| Long-lived data on classical key exchange | Systems carrying data with a long shelf life that still use RSA or ECDH key exchange | Inventory plus data classification |
| Key store readiness | Share of KMS, HSMs and secrets managers that support ML-KEM and ML-DSA keys | Vendor answers, product tests |
| Vendor readiness | Share of critical suppliers with a dated PQC roadmap | Procurement questionnaires |
| Crypto-agility | Share of applications where the algorithm is configuration, not code | Architecture review, crypto-agility platform |
| Programme status | Roadmap approved, funded, with owners and milestones | Governance records |
A composite score is useful for boards and trend lines; the individual metrics are what engineering teams act on.
Most maturity models use four or five levels. The bands below are the ones DuoKey uses for the Quantum Risk Score:
| Score | Level | What it typically looks like |
|---|---|---|
| 0 to 39 | Low readiness | RSA-2048 and ECDSA dominant throughout. No hybrid key exchange. Long-retention data exposed to harvest now, decrypt later |
| 40 to 69 | Early readiness | Modern TLS in use, but only classical algorithms. No migration plan visible |
| 70 to 89 | Developing readiness | Classical and post-quantum key exchange running in parallel. Crypto-agile architecture demonstrable. CBOM published. Migration path documented against at least one regulatory timeline |
| 90 to 100 | Advanced readiness | Post-quantum by architecture. Crypto-agility validated. Continuous CBOM monitoring. Deprecation schedules tracked operationally |
Other frameworks exist, such as the PKI Consortium's PQC extension to its PKI Maturity Model. Whichever you use, keep the same scale over time so progress is comparable.
A readiness assessment can start from outside your network or from inside it. Most organizations need both.
| Outside-in | Inside-out | |
|---|---|---|
| Looks at | Public domains and endpoints: TLS versions, key exchange groups, certificates, DNSSEC, public evidence of a migration programme | Code, binaries, filesystems, keystores, KMS and HSM keys, internal TLS, VPNs, SSH |
| Access needed | None | Scanners or agents with internal access |
| Time to first result | Days | Weeks to months, then continuous |
| Output | A baseline score and the exposure an attacker can see | A full CBOM and inventory with owners |
| Best for | Board baseline, prioritizing public endpoints, peer comparison, vendor due diligence | Migration planning and regulatory evidence |
The DuoKey Quantum Risk Score (QRS) is a free, outside-in PQC readiness assessment of your domain. It produces a 0 to 100 composite index from four weighted signals, using a published formula:
| Signal | Weight | What it measures |
|---|---|---|
| Algorithm resilience | 40% | Public-key algorithms and cipher suites in production, against FIPS 203, 204 and 205 |
| Crypto agility | 30% | TLS 1.3 adoption, hybrid support, certificate rotation cadence, CAA and DNSSEC |
| Harvest exposure | 20% | Data at risk under harvest now, decrypt later: forward secrecy, data lifespan, long-retention endpoints |
| Migration posture | 10% | Public evidence of a programme: published CBOM, hybrid endpoint testing, vendor disclosures |
The report includes an executive summary, a cryptographic inventory of the observable domain surface, a migration priority matrix, a regulatory timeline mapping and a 36-month migration sequence, followed by a review session with a DuoKey cryptographer. It needs no access to internal systems.
The QRS measures observable posture. It is a baseline and a trend indicator, not a security audit or a regulatory attestation. For the inside-out view, DuoKey's PQC Scanner produces CBOMs and DuoKey CPM keeps the inventory and readiness metrics current.
Q: What is PQC readiness?
PQC readiness is how prepared an organization is to replace quantum-vulnerable public-key cryptography with post-quantum algorithms before quantum computers and regulatory deadlines make it necessary. It covers visibility of cryptography, exposure, crypto-agility and a funded migration programme.
Q: How do you measure PQC readiness?
With a small set of metrics: inventory coverage, share of quantum-vulnerable components, adoption of hybrid ML-KEM key exchange, key store and vendor readiness, crypto-agility and programme status. Many organizations combine them into a composite score, such as the 0 to 100 Quantum Risk Score, and track it quarterly.
Q: What is a PQC readiness assessment?
A structured review that establishes where an organization stands today: which cryptography it uses, how exposed it is, and what stands in the way of migration. It can be outside-in (public endpoints, no access needed) or inside-out (scans of code, hosts and key stores), and its output feeds the PQC migration roadmap.
Q: What is the difference between PQC readiness and crypto-agility?
Crypto-agility is one part of PQC readiness: the technical ability to change algorithms without redesigning systems. Readiness also includes knowing where cryptography is used, understanding exposure and having a funded plan.
Q: How long does a PQC readiness assessment take?
An outside-in assessment of public domains takes days. A full internal assessment with CBOMs and vendor questionnaires usually takes several weeks to a few months, and then becomes continuous monitoring.
Q: Is quantum readiness the same as PQC readiness?
In practice, yes. "Quantum readiness" and "post-quantum readiness" are used interchangeably for preparing cryptography for quantum computers. Some organizations also use "quantum readiness" for adopting quantum computing itself, which is a different topic.
Written by
DuoKey Team
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